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These are, in many ways, halcyon days for global business. In a vast ideological shift in the late 20th 
century, markets rather than governments came to be seen as the road to prosperity. Governments that 
once nationalized foreign firms now seek out the investment, technology, and managerial expertise such 
companies can bring. The halls of the United Nations used to ring with calls for international regulation of 
those dreaded evil-doers, the multinational corporations. Now the UN instead implores business to join 
with it in a voluntary Global Compact to ensure respect for internationally agreed environmental, labor, 
and human rights standards. 
And business has truly gone global. Surging transportation and communications technologies in the past 
few decades have encouraged firms the world over to cross borders, and revitalized industries in Europe 
and Japan have offered new competition to U.S. firms. At the beginning of the 1990s, some 35,000 parent 
multinational corporations had roughly 170,000 foreign affiliates. By the end of the decade, 60,000 parent 
companies had more than 500,000 foreign affiliates, accounting for a quarter of global output in the late 
1990s. As transnationals reorganize the production of goods and services, production itself is becoming 
global in structure.  
But there are clouds on the global business horizon that go beyond the current dour economic climate. 
The lack of effective international (and often national) regulation to protect workers, communities, and 
the environment has spurred the development of a powerful movement aimed at promoting corporate 
social responsibility, whose partisans have on occasion forced significant changes in business practices 
through campaigns aimed at consumers and investors. And because unregulated business activities can 
cause societies to question the legitimacy of corporations, corporate leaders themselves are struggling 
with fundamental questions about how far their social responsibilities extend: to shareholders, employees, 
local communities where they operate, humanity as a whole, future generations? 
National Regulation? 
Repeated efforts, starting with the proposed International Trade Organization in the 1940s, to create 
internationally agreed rules to regulate cross-border business have all failed. Regulation of these firms 
thus falls to national governments. But governments are often finding it difficult to cope. 
Megacompanies’ huge resources dwarf those of national prosecutors, making legal control a challenge. 
Changes in the ways global corporations produce goods also complicate national regulation. Companies 
both big and small contract out with suppliers in far-flung parts of the world—Disney reputedly has some 
300,000 separate suppliers. A company with a brand name such as Levi Strauss or WalMart effectively 
controls a long chain of frequently shifting suppliers based primarily in low-wage countries, thus 
controlling much of what suppliers do: what product quality standards and schedules must be met, what 
products will be produced. But for the most part, control over such matters as working conditions in and 
environmental spillovers from those suppliers’ facilities remains in the hands of the national governments 
where suppliers are located. Because enforcement of labor and environmental standards in those low-
wage countries is often, to put it mildly, less than fully effective, this pattern of production enables rich-
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country firms to reap the benefits of low production costs without having to pay attention to the 
associated social costs. 
Even in countries with well-established regulatory systems and effective courts, a determined company 
can flout the law. Some get caught, but only after doing extensive damage. Louisiana-Pacific Corporation 
was recently assessed the largest criminal fine in the 28-year history of the U.S. Clean Air Act. The 
company, which employs some 13,000 people in the United States, Canada, and Ireland and grossed $2.5 
billion in sales in 1997, pleaded guilty to 18 felonies and agreed to pay $37 million in penalties and $5.5 
million for criminal violations of the Clean Air Act. 
The corporation was caught only because a former company supervisor filed a lawsuit against it alleging 
that he had been fired for refusing to tamper with one facility’s pollution monitoring equipment. That is a 
rather haphazard way to regulate, but federal and state environmental officials cannot possibly closely 
supervise the vast array of firms operating in the United States. 
National regulation, where it exists, falls far short. Many governments seem unable or unwilling to ensure 
that national standards exist and are adequately enforced. No matter how much corporations may 
complain (sometimes justifiably) about the heavy hand of government regulation, the market side has the 
upper hand. 
To fill the governance gap, an extraordinary variety of nongovernmental groups has sprung up. Activist 
groups are proving adept at shaming or coercing corporations into paying attention to what activists say 
are the broader social responsibilities of the private sector. And some in the corporate world seem to be 
listening. 
Corporate Codes: Cover Up, Try-out, or Buy-In? 
During the late 1970s corporations began to face nongovernmental pressures to change the way they saw 
their role in the world. Principles and codes of conduct began appearing, mostly among U.S. companies 
responding to waves of bad publicity from revelations that some had been paying bribes overseas—a 
practice banned by the 1977 U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
As corporate cross-border activity blossomed, new campaigns demanded change in corporate practices on 
everything from worker rights to environmental sustainability. By the 1990s, a new “corporate social 
responsibility” movement was in full swing. Corporations began learning that failing to comply with 
consumer and investor preferences about their behavior can be costly. 
Today many companies are creating “codes of conduct” that go beyond what local law requires. The 
codes are meant to protect company reputations and reassure consumers that their production processes 
are environmentally benign and that working conditions are decent. 
Sometimes governments encourage the code-of-conduct trend. In the United States, the Clinton White 
House set up an Apparel Industry Partnership that put forward a code of conduct setting standards for 
working conditions, applicable not only to participating companies but also to their foreign contractors. 
Business associations have also gotten in on the act. In 1990 the International Chamber of Commerce set 
forth a Business Charter for Sustainable Development that has since been signed by more than 2,500 
companies worldwide. 
But the big push for such codes has come from civil society groups, whose intense public criticism of 
corporate behavior can drive away customers and investors if left unanswered. Their spotlight has shone 
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even on firms that consider themselves socially progressive. Starbucks Coffee, faced with intense 
picketing by activists denouncing conditions at the Guatemalan coffee plantations where it purchases 
beans, eventually issued a code of conduct and action plans for all its suppliers. 
By now, almost every self-respecting large corporation has a code of conduct. But the codes are highly 
controversial. Proponents generally see them as a valuable way to get corporations to buy into new norms 
of behavior without the need for government intervention, making them attractive to corporate leaders 
who want to fend off government regulation. More ambitious proponents see them as a means of 
gradually achieving consensus around standards of behavior that can be tried out voluntarily, then 
eventually adopted and enforced by governments. Detractors portray them as mere fig leaves. 
Corporate codes are of two sorts. The first is “aspirational”—a general statement of what corporations 
aim to do. The Caux Principles, put forward by the Caux Roundtable, a group of senior executives from 
leading firms based in Europe, Japan, and the United States, are a good example. They consist of general 
principles, broad to the point of mushiness (corporations should operate in a spirit of honesty and fairness, 
should contribute to the economic and social development of the communities where they operate and the 
world community at large), and slightly more specific stakeholder principles—essentially promises to 
obey the law and not to cheat. Human rights get a brief mention. But the Caux Principles’ formulators 
point out one big selling point: because the document was devised by business leaders, its ethical norms 
are more likely than those from other sources to be broadly accepted by the business community. Many 
firms use the Caux Principles as the basis for their own codes of conduct. 
These aspirational codes require no confirmation of whether firms are meeting their commitments. 
Because the codes are arising piecemeal—by the thousands, all with different specifications—comparing 
what various firms are promising to do is difficult. And many firms do no monitoring at all. 
The second type of code is more demanding. It requires specific commitments on labor or environmental 
standards, along with independent confirmation of whether commitments are being met. Once a code is 
established, an independent external auditor comes in, assesses whether a company is in full compliance, 
and if so certifies it. The firm can then advertise its compliance and display the stamp of approval on its 
products. The nonprofit Council on Economic Priorities, in collaboration with human rights 
organizations, businesses, and auditing companies, devised a code of conduct called Social 
Accountability 8000, intended to become the global standard on workers’ rights. Companies that adopt 
the code permit outside auditors to inspect every facility and assess practices on child labor, health and 
safety, freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, 
working hours, and—a matter excluded from most corporate codes—whether compensation provides 
workers a living wage. 
Compliance with such externally monitored codes of conduct is completely voluntary. No government 
enforces them; no international organization has made the standards law. Instead, the assumption is that 
corporations will want to be so certified because they will find it good for business—because consumers 
will prefer to buy certified products. 
How successful such codes will be remains unclear. A few big companies, including Toys R Us and 
Avon, have announced they will buy only from SA-8000-certified suppliers, and Avon is the first to be so 
certified. But some industry groups object strongly, arguing that the ever-mounting costs of certification 
with the growing array of standards are too great and that industry should set and monitor its own 
standards. 
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They have a point. Certification is expensive. Corporations are being flooded with demands to meet 
standard after standard. Some demands come from groups whose claim to represent a broad public 
interest seems dubious. It is not at all clear who should decide exactly what standards the codes should 
uphold. 
Another question is: “Quis custodiet custodes”“—who will watch the watchers? The complexities show 
up in the current competition over who should monitor the treatment of overseas labor by U.S. garment 
manufacturers, who are often accused of subjecting their workers to sweatshop conditions. On one side is 
the Fair Labor Association (FLA), the outcome of a Clinton administration presidential task force that 
included both human rights groups and major corporations. On the other is the Worker Rights Consortium 
(WRC), a university coalition formed by the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS). The two 
groups hotly contest each other’s motives, methods, and primary goals. FLA member companies agree to 
have conditions in their overseas contractors’ factories monitored by independent agencies, but the 
company hires the monitor and the reports are not made public. The USAS says this is not good enough, 
and it set up the WRC to inspect factories that produce goods bearing the trademarks of and licensed by 
American colleges and universities. 
Such problems are not surprising. The certification approach is essentially an effort to replace a 
government function?—inspection—that even most governments have found difficult to do. There is no 
particular reason to think private inspectors will systematically do better than public ones or that private 
resources can readily be found to pay for necessary inspections if public resources are unavailable. By 
default, many of the private inspections are being carried out by big accounting firms, whose expertise 
lies in a different kind of inspection. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the leader in “social accounting,” allowed Dara O’Rourke, of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, to accompany its auditors on factory inspections of labor practices in China and 
Korea. O’Rourke’s report is disturbing. In one inspection, the PwC auditor found some questions she was 
supposed to ask workers “embarrassing” and skipped them; she answered other questions herself without 
bothering to ask the workers. In another, the factory president selected the workers to be interviewed, and 
the auditors skipped all questions about freedom of association, collective bargaining, child labor, and 
forced labor, claiming that because the factory had no union the questions were not relevant. In both 
cases, the auditors, financial specialists who had gotten a crash course in social and environmental 
monitoring, missed major health and safety violations. 
The Global Compact 
A third model can be found at the United Nations. In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
promulgated a “Global Compact” which he asked corporations to sign to indicate voluntary adherence to 
nine widely accepted UN principles on human rights, labor standards, and the environment. Signatories 
are supposed to report annually on progress in implementing these principles. The Compact thus does not 
require outside certification but does insist on at least some degree of public accounting. 
The Global Compact, like most compromises, provokes criticisms from both sides. Activist groups object 
to the unverified self-reporting, claiming that notorious corporate bad guys will be allowed to wrap 
themselves in the UN logo without making any real change. The head of the International Chamber of 
Commerce protests that “business should not be called upon to meet demands and expectations that are 
properly the preserve of governments.” 
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Despite such skepticism, voluntary corporate codes may improve corporate behavior even without the 
coercion that backs up governmental regulation. Companies do care about their reputations. Reputations 
are increasingly going global, leaving corporations increasingly vulnerable to new pressures. 
Even self-reporting systems such as the Global Compact could turn out to be more effective than expected 
if corporations take seriously (or are pressured into taking seriously) the reports they are supposed to file 
each year. Self-reporting, while not ideal, has two potentially beneficial effects. First, it forces the 
corporation to take a look at its own practices, if only to justify them. Although many corporations will 
seize the opportunity to exercise the art of spin, some will discover things about themselves that they may 
want to change. Second, activist groups won’t accept those reports at face value. Several groups have 
already promised to scrutinize them. By signing the Compact, the corporations have agreed to be held to 
standards of behavior going beyond what governmental regulations require. The activist groups intend to 
provide the fire to hold to the corporations’ collective feet. 
Who Knows? 
Whether the groups can do so depends on whether they can amass meaningful information about the 
degree of corporate compliance. The big missing piece in the corporate code puzzle has been how to 
make the necessary information public in some systematic fashion that makes it possible to compare 
organizations and to evaluate claims of good (or bad) behavior. 
Into the morass has stepped the Global Reporting Initiative, a polyglot array of corporations, accounting 
firms, and environmental, human rights, and labor organizations, which has developed a framework for 
voluntary reporting on corporate economic, environmental, and social performance. Its Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines, tested in draft form on 21 companies in the late 1990s, were revised in June 2000 
and again in 2002. Already, companies are using the GRI framework to report on their compliance with 
the UN Global Compact. 
Who Cares? 
All disclosure-based “regulation” depends on the assumption that someone somewhere cares about the 
information that gets released. The usual argument, especially by certifiers, is that consumers care, 
particularly consumers in rich countries with the buying power that impresses corporations. 
Unfortunately, the share of consumers who demonstrate a preference for “certified” goods is substantially 
lower than the share who make that claim in marketing surveys. Consumer pressure has had far more 
success improving product safety than working conditions. It took unions—workers looking out for their 
own interests—to do that. 
But corporations have other obligations besides those to consumers. They must also satisfy investors. And 
rapidly growing numbers of investors are adding social responsibility to their criteria for selecting 
companies in which to invest. Shareholder activism first became prominent in the late 1970s as part of an 
anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa and has flourished, most strikingly in the United States. In 
1984, according to the Social Investment Forum, roughly $40 billion in U.S. assets under professional 
management had undergone some sort of social or environmental screening. By 1995, the total was $639 
billion. Two years later, it had cracked the $1 trillion mark, and by 2001, it had reached $2.3 trillion. 
What constitutes socially responsible behavior varies according to who is doing the screening. The single 
most widely used criterion is simple: no tobacco. Screens can include everything from environmental 
sustainability to treatment of workers to animal rights. Religious mutual funds and indexes use the beliefs 
of specific faiths as criteria. 
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Focusing on investors addresses one key legitimacy question about screening. Even in the most 
conservative perspective on the social role of the corporation, those who own it are entitled to a 
significant say in what goals it should be trying to achieve. And with evidence mounting that screened 
investments match or outperform the market, the $6 trillion locked up in U.S. pension funds may offer 
another avenue for growth. People who control workers’ pensions just might find themselves under 
pressure to take seriously workers’ rights. 
Regulation by Revelation 
The effort to devise meaningful rules for global corporations matters greatly. Future global prosperity 
depends in part on whether corporate practices encourage a widespread sharing of the benefits of 
economic integration, and future environmental stability depends on whether corporate activities are 
carried out in an environmentally sustainable fashion. The private sector could decide of its own volition 
to behave with the necessary degree of social responsibility, either out of altruism or from an enlightened 
view of long-term self-interest. Some will, but most probably will not. Nor will governments be able to 
regulate them into compliance with high standards, given the lack of capacity of many governments and 
the growing ability of corporations to pick up and leave any too-effective jurisdiction. Thus the need for 
credible regulation by revelation, using transparency to determine whether corporations are adhering to 
codes of socially responsible conduct. 
Those who distrust corporations on principle will not be satisfied with such “soft law,” and no one can yet 
be assured the approach will work on a large scale. This soft approach is an evolving process. 
Increasingly, corporations are being held to new standards of social responsibility that go far beyond legal 
requirements to enrich shareholders and obey the rules governments make. The dispute over exactly what 
those standards should be—and who should decide—has just begun. 
 
